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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that the condition of education and the economy of the low
performing sub-Saharan African countries can be characterized as a stagnant steady
state — a “trap”. We present a simple heterogeneous-agent model in which high costs of
education relative to income and the skill premium can cause the economy to be trapped
in such a steady state with minimal educational attainment. We calibrate the model
to available data from the sub-Saharan African countries to study policies that could
potentially free these trapped economies and set them on a path to a higher steady
state. We ﬁnd that a tax and subsidy scheme that redistributes resources at the trap
from poor households with lower ability children to those with higher ability children
can pry the economy out of the trap, thus freeing it from dependence on foreign aid in
order to achieve the same goal. In addition to the direct cost, a portion of the indirect
cost also needs to be subsidized. Moreover, such a policy outperforms the abolition
of child labor and the institution and enforcement of compulsory education laws when
expenditure neutral welfare comparisons are made.
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The state of education in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa (sSA) is perilous. In its
assessment of the progress toward universal primary education, the UNESCO document,
Education for All: Year 2000 Assessment, notes that several regions are far from achieving
it, “... and in the case of sSA, actually lagging behind.” Similar sentiments are voiced by the
Oxfam report, Education Now. In the poorest performing countries in this region, enroll-
ments are particularly low, dropout rates high, incomes mostly stagnant, costs of schooling
signiﬁcant relative to income, income inequality high, government expenditure per pupil low,
and opportunities of employment for the educated scarce. These indicators have shown little
or no improvement in the last two or three decades and in some cases have actually worsened.
The AIDS epidemic of the nineties has further exacerbated the situation by decreasing life
expectancy in some of these countries.
Popular discussion of policy alternatives to improve the condition of education and the
economy of this region, in the above documents and elsewhere, include foreign aid, abolition
of child labor, and institution of compulsory education. Is foreign aid the only way these
stagnant economies can develop or can domestic funds trigger development? Is universal
enrollment possible and even desirable? How eﬀective will the above-mentioned institutional
reforms be? These are some of the questions we address in this paper.
We ﬁrst argue that the worst-performing sSA countries can be characterized as being at
a trap, or proximal to one. The word trap is used as a metaphor for a stagnant steady state
with a poor economic outcome, rather than a situation in which all outcomes are literally
zero.1 We present a simple model of education attainment with educated and uneducated
workers that exhibits a trap when the high cost of education relative to income lowers the
return to investment in education. We calibrate this model to economies in this region and
then study policies that have the potential to free them from the trap, which allows us to
shed some light on the above questions.
We build on the simple heterogeneous-agent, two-period overlapping generations model
of education acquisition developed in Caucutt and Kumar (2003); unlike that paper, we
model indirect costs explicitly and focus on theoretical conditions that give rise to a trap.2
A liquidity constrained parent, who is either an “educated” or “uneducated” worker, makes
the decision of whether or not to incur the cost of educating a child taking into account the
child’s ability, which captures both the academic ability of the child and unmodeled traits
1Indeed, in what follows we normalize the “uneducated” to have two years of education and refer to the
steady state in which no one obtains education higher than this as a trap.
2In Caucutt and Kumar (2003) we focus on a unique steady state with positive education attainment
and calibrate it to the US economy in order to study whether further subsidization of college education is
warranted. Needless to say, the calibration strategy and the policies considered in the present paper are
completely diﬀerent from those considered for the US.
1that make some families more functional than others. The probability that a child who is
sent to school will become an educated worker the following period depends positively on
this ability. Any child who drops out (fails) will remain an uneducated worker next period.
The two types of workers are imperfect substitutes in aggregate production.
We develop conditions that give rise to a locally stable “trap” in which all workers
remain uneducated. A trap typically occurs when the initial fraction of educated people in
the workforce is too low. The wages of the uneducated workers are too low for them to ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to send their children to school. This results in a decrease in the fraction of
educated workers next period, which further decreases the wages of the uneducated workers
and reinforces the above-mentioned behavior. We derive intuitive suﬃcient conditions for
this to occur; a trap is more likely when the cost of education relative to the income of the
uneducated is high, the wage gain to becoming educated is low, the discount rate is high,
and the curvature of the utility function is high.
The method of conducting policy experiments on a calibrated model is particularly useful
in the context of a trap, where paucity of good quality data precludes detailed econometric
analysis. We calibrate the model using data from several countries in the region, so that a
typical economy in this region is close to a trap. We then consider policies that have the
potential to free the economy from a trap and set it on a path to higher education attainment
and output. Since the behavior of the uneducated poor, who form the vast majority close
to the trap, is responsible for the trap, it is natural to consider a policy of subsidizing their
direct and indirect costs of education. Two features of the model, heterogeneity in types
and heterogeneity in ability, play important roles in these policy experiments. The former
allows redistribution from richer to poorer parents. However, in the trap everyone is poor.
So the kick-start at the trap comes from the latter heterogeneity, that is, the redistribution
from poor, low-ability families to those with higher ability.3
The indivisible cost of education, liquidity constraints, and the focus on aggregate wel-
fare give rise to this redistribution motive; if the return to education falls a bit short of
the amount required for enrollment to all agents, aggregate welfare could be improved by
redistributing and making the return attractive for the most able students. This motivation
for redistribution is similar in spirit, for instance, to those surveyed by Aghion et. al. (1999);
however the focus of redistribution for us, at least at the trap, is across ability levels rather
than income levels.
A tax and subsidy scheme that enables such a redistribution is not only able to set the
economy on a path toward a better steady state, but also does better in terms of welfare —
both across steady states and including transition — than a scheme that abolishes child labor
or one that institutes and enforces compulsory enrollment. Under revenue neutrality, these
3A compulsory education system would override this kind of redistribution. In the next section we provide
evidence that compulsory education laws, even if they exist on paper, are not enforced. We also consider, in
our policy experiments, the consequences of enforcing such laws.
2latter policies are unable to reverse the loss of contributions low ability children would have
made to their families had they not been forced to attend school.4
In one of the experiments, we compute the educational expenditure, as a fraction of
GDP, that would be required to transform the stagnant economy to one that is similar to
Mauritius, at least as far as educational attainment is concerned. Even though Mauritius
is not considered while calibrating the model economy, the model outcome for expenditure-
GDP ratio in the above experiment is quite close to the one seen in data for Mauritius. This
outcome gives us conﬁdence in using the calibrated model as a vehicle for studying policy
changes, and in the eﬃcacy of education policies in reviving a stagnant economy.
These simulations question the stated goal of several agencies of achieving universal
enrollment. At the current stage of development of these economies and the quality of their
educational systems that are likely to prevail in the near future, policies that guarantee
this level of enrollment need not be welfare improving. The experiments also show that the
economy need not depend on foreign aid in order to develop.
We are silent in our study on the issues of gender disparities and the AIDS epidemic, for
reasons of theoretical and quantitative tractability. While some of the sub-Saharan African
countries we examine do have pronounced gender disparities, others do not; it thus does not
seem that a gender bias alone can explain the low aggregate enrollment and attainment seen
in the region. Increasing life expectancy by addressing the AIDS problem would aﬀect school
enrollments and attainment. Better education can, in turn, aﬀect life expectancy through a
better understanding of health and hygiene. However, our silence on this aspect is mitigated
by the increase in life expectancy between 1980 and 1998 seen in several of the countries we
focus our attention. Likewise, we do not model fertility choice. However, it seems that the
in-kind education subsidy policy we consider is likely to be all the more important in a trap
characterized by low education and high fertility. Such a policy would tilt incentives towards
the quality of children rather than their quantity.5
Clearly, factors other than education contribute to the economic stagnation of the region;
therefore, we view our analysis as only one step in understanding the complex economic and
educational condition of this region.6
There are several models of development traps in the literature. See, for instance, the
recent article by Azariadis (1996) and the references therein. Features such as ﬁxed costs and
liquidity constraints have been highlighted as potential sources of traps in earlier studies.
4Since the government we consider taxes people only for the sake of ﬁnancing education, expenditure and
revenue neutrality are equivalent.
5Incorporating fertility decisions — as done in Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990) or Galor and Weil
(2000) — in our model, is left for future research. Galor and Weil (2000) view stagnation as a transitory, yet
long-lasting, phenomenon and explore the role of human capital in this transition.
6Sachs and Warner (1997), for instance, point to lack of openness to international markets and geographical
factors as reasons for African stagnation.
3However, unlike most earlier studies our model features heterogeneity in education and thus
earnings.7 Even if a positive steady state is reached in our model, there will be a mix of
educated and uneducated agents. This seems empirically more relevant than having all agents
acquire the same level of human capital, high or low, as in a representative agent framework.
While a condition for a trap to occur could be equally well derived in a representative
agent model, in order to study the “diﬀusion” of education over time it is necessary to
explicitly model the dynamics of heterogeneity. We can also focus attention on those agents
whose behavior is responsible for the education trap, the uneducated poor. In contrast, a
representative agent model, or similarly our model with linear utility, would assign the same
cost of education to all parents making it hard to discern the dynamic eﬀect of the poor
parents’ behavior in the neighborhood of a trap. Heterogeneity also allows us to shed light
on the forces governing inequality in earnings.
Perhaps the most novel aspect of our study is the calibration of a trap to actual economies
and policy experiments we conduct to pry them out of the trap. We are thus able to make
quantitative assessments in a ﬁeld of study that has thus far remained mainly qualitative.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy survey the condition
of education in sSA to motivate our study and provide the rationale for using a model with
a trap to study them. Section 3 describes the model and provides a suﬃcient condition for a
locally stable trap. We turn to calibrating the model to a “typical” sSA economy in Section
4, and present the results of our policy experiments in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Condition of Education and the Economy in Sub-Saharan
Africa
The above-mentioned UNESCO document sounds an alarming note about the state of ed-
ucation in sub-Saharan Africa (sSA). It states that while most of the world is on course to
achieving universal access to primary education, other parts of the world are actually slip-
ping behind: “The problem is part i c u l a r l ym a r k e di ns S A ,w i t ha ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro f
children not in school.” The Oxfam report calls the education situation there “particularly
7The work by Galor and Zeira (1993) does feature heterogeneity in bequests, which can be used for human
capital investment; they use “warm glow” preferences in bequest to simplify the aggregation problem, while
we rely on limited heterogeneity. Unlike their model, enrollment does not mean success is automatic in our
model; it is probabilistic and depends on ability. Given the very high rates of dropout observed in sSA this
feature is empirically relevant; moreover it leads to the implication that redistribution even among the poor
is capable of prying the economy out of a trap. The Galor and Zeira (1993) setup allows one to think of
redistribution in the conventional sense — from the rich to the poor — but this channel is inoperative at a trap.
In their model exogenous shocks can alter the transition function.
Such an external shock can shift the transition function upward in the representative agent setup of Becker,
Murphy, and Tamura (1990) as well. In contrast to these papers we focus on policy measures that would shift
the transition function.
4dire.” In this section we highlight some aspects of the condition of basic education and of
the economy in this region using data from the above two reports and from other sources.
The aim is not to provide a comprehensive description of the state of education in sSA, but
enough details to motivate our study as well as to make empirical contact for the model we
will be using; we note these connections as we proceed. While trends for the sSA region as a
whole are presented, attention is focused on eighteen countries which particularly lag behind
in education attainment. Data on selected variables for this sub-sample are presented in
Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1
The condition of education in a sub-sample of sub-Saharan African countries
country % no % prim. % sec. prim. sch. sec. sch. prim. gross sec. gross apparent surv. rate surv. rate prim. drop sec. rep. exp / GNPexp / student
education complete complete years years enrollment enrollment intake to grade 2 to grade 6 rate rate (dollars)
Angola 91.7 12.3 75.8 66 4.9
Benin 71.8 4.7 1.1 1.43 0.3 58.1 11.9 75.9 84 45 60 31 3.2
Burkina Faso 33.3 7.2 32.5 93 69 29 19 2.7 84
Burundi 72.8 5.6 68.3 83 61 23 14 3.4 69
Central African 64.5 6.7 1.2 1.47 0.32 65 11.7 59.5 69 17 38 29 2.2 73
Chad 54.4 7.8 55.2 85 44 29 20 36
Djibouti 38.1 11.9 35.9 100 88
Guinea 37.1 10 43 87 52 33 23 2
Guinea-Bissau 77.2 2.1 0.5 0.54 0.11 67.9 9 84.5 92 20 137
Malawi 50.4 9.2 1.3 2.53 0.15 67.9 7.7 101 92 53 58 2 3.4 31
Mali 87.3 2 0.5 0.8 0.06 26.5 7 26.7 94 70 50 26 2.2 207
Mozambique 67.7 7.1 0.4 0.83 0.08 66.9 7.6 73.3 75 60 27 4.1 163
Niger 84.2 2.9 0.4 0.66 0.15 28.8 6.6 27.4 93 57 18 19 3.2
Rwanda 56.3 8.1 0.6 1.67 0.15 63.1 8 94.1 85 52 50 6 2.7 107
Somalia 13.6 8 0.5
Tanzania 43.3 9.6 0.1 2.44 0.15 69.7 4.9 78 94 83 27 3.4
Uganda 60.1 6.7 0.3 1.6 0.15 74.5 13.2 24.3 1.5
average 66.3 5.9 0.6 1.4 0.2 54.7 8.8 62.1 87.2 57.6 43.8 19.7 2.8 100.8
median 66.1 6.7 0.5 1.45 0.15 63.1 8 68.3 87 55 38 20 2.95 84
Sources:
All data (unless otherwise noted) is for the year 1990 or closest year for which data is available.
% of population (over 15) with no education: Barro & Lee (1996)
% of primary school complete in population over 15: Barro & Lee (1996)
% of secondary school complete in population over 15: Barro & Lee (1996)
Average years of primary schooling in population over 15: Barro & Lee (1996)
Average years of secondary schooling in population over 15: Barro & Lee (1996)
primary gross enrollment rate: World Education Indiactors (WEI), UNESCO
secondary gross enrollment rate: WEI, UNESCO
apparent intake rate (% of primary eligible students enrolling in the first grade regardless of age): WEI, UNESCO
survival ratio to grade 2: WEI, UNESCO
survival ratio to grade 6: WEI, UNESCO
primary school droput rate: Barro & Lee (1996)
secondary repetition rate: Barro & Lee (1996)
public education expenditure as a % of GNP: WEI, UNESCO
primary expenditure per student in $: Barro & Lee (1996)
• Low enrollment rates: Most educational indicators for sSA have either been stag-
nant at or declining from already poor levels. While the gross enrollment ratios in
primary education having been increasing between 1990 and 1998 and approaching
100% in regions such as Latin America, the Caribbean, and East Asia, this ratio has
seen little change over the period in sSA, hovering around 75%. For our sub-sample of
countries, the average gross enrollment rate was much lower, at about 55%. The me-
dian net intake rate — the new entrants in the ﬁrst grade of primary education who are
of the oﬃcial primary school entrance age, expressed as a percentage of the population
5of the corresponding age — was 34% in sSA as late as 1998.8 In the vicinity of the trap
in our calibrated model, enrollments are likewise low.
Over the last decade, the number of out-of-school children has continued to increase in
this region. The region has the largest proportion of out-of-school children, at about
40%; in a third of the countries, 60% or more of children are not in school. Evidently,
compulsory schooling laws, even where they might exist in paper, are not enforced.
• Low attainment: While the trends indicate decline, the level of educational attain-
ment for the sub-sample of sSA countries is already very low. In the year 1990, the
average ﬁgure for percentage of population over 15 with no education (computed from
Barro and Lee (1996)) was over 66%, the percentage who completed primary educa-
tion was less than 6%, while the percentage who completed secondary education was
negligible, at 0.6%. Moreover, from Barro & Lee (1996) we can see that for most of
t h e s ec o u n t r i e st h e r ew a sad r o pi n%o fp o p u l a t i o nw i t hp r i m a r ya t t a i n m e n tb e t w e e n
1985 and 1990. The average attainment as measured in years of education was about
1.4 at the primary level and at 0.15 was negligible at the secondary level. We use this
data to motivate our deﬁnition of “uneducated” workers in the model.
• High dropout rates: Among those who do attend, the dropout and repetition rates
have continued to be high. From Barro and Lee (1996) we see that the average primary
school dropout rate in our sub-sample was close to 44%, with Guinea-Bissau having a
rate of 92%. While the dropout rate dropped from about 58% in 1970 to about 48%
in 1975, improvements since then have been rare, with an increase between 1980 and
1985. The primary repetition rate decreased in 1990 relative to the rate in 1965 for
only two countries, and either increased or was the same for all other countries. Among
the students who go on to the secondary level, the repetition rate is about 20%. Such
poor performance is probably not surprising given a steady deterioration in quality of
schools, with the highest pupil-teacher ratios in the world; this already high ratio of
50 in 1990 for Central and Western Africa rose to 52 in 1998.
Such dropouts will be an integral part of our model. Our strategy of holding constant
the quality of the educational system in the policy experiments is driven by the above-
mentioned sluggishness in indicators of school quality.
8Pritchett (1996) argues that sSA’s educational capital grew at a rapid rate between 1960 and 1985. While
he draws this conclusion based on data for the entire sSA region, we concentrate on the poorest performing
economies. Moreover, a small increase in the years of education in a region with a very low level of initial
attainment translates into a large rate of increase. His aim is to argue that growth in education has not
translated into economic growth worldwide, while our focus is on steady state levels. His data on educational
share of the wage bill, which at 26.3% is the lowest in sSA, concurs well with the evidence presented in this
section.
6• High costs: I ns p i t eo fg o v e r n m e n ti n v o l v e m e n ti np r i m a r ye d u c a t i o n ,t h ec o s to f
schooling to parents is signiﬁcant. The Oxfam report discusses the various types of
direct costs incurred by parents — oﬃcial fees such as tuition, levies imposed by schools
and parent-teacher associations, unoﬃcial fees charged by schools, out-of-pocket pay-
ments for uniforms, textbooks, pencils, transport, and meals, and community contri-
butions in cash or kind. The report states that in Zambia, over 70% of the recurrent
budget for education is now ﬁnanced by households. From the ﬁgures reported by Ablo
and Reinikka (1998) for Uganda, we compute that more than 66% of school expenses
are borne by parents, amounting to about 5.3% of their income.
The opportunity costs are also signiﬁcant, and are related to loss of work both within
and outside the household. Caring for animals, pounding grain, caring for siblings,
fetching wood and water, are only some of the activities school-aged children engage
in. Even in the relatively aﬄuent Botswana, Bigala and Moorad (1998) report that the
single largest reason (40.4%) for children not attending formal school is “looking after
cattle.” Based on a detailed survey done in Madagascar, Bredie and Beeharry (1998)
estimate the opportunity cost of attending school is more than 20 hours per week.
The Oxfam report cites surveys from Kenya, Zimbabwe, Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire to
suggest that children did not attend school because it was “too expensive.”
We model direct and indirect costs explicitly. As we show in the theoretical section, a
high education cost is one of the factors responsible for a trap.
• Low government expenditures: The government expenditure on education as a
fraction of GNP for the sSA sub-sample we consider was 2.8% in 1990 (WDI 2000).
This seemingly healthy ﬁgure is a result of the low GNP of these countries rather than
high expenditures. This is corroborated by per pupil expenditure ﬁgures. As the Ox-
fam report notes, “... sub-Saharan Africa allocates 25 per cent more of its GDP to
education than Latin America, but achieves a per-capita spending level which is 80
percent below.” From the data in Barro and Lee (1996) we can see that the real gov-
ernment current educational expenditure per pupil decreased from 135.6 international
dollars in 1960 to 79.8 international dollars in 1990 in our sub-sample.
We ﬁnd in our calibration that the prevailing level of government expenditure is insuf-
ﬁcient to move the economy out of the trap.
7Table 2
Economic and other variables in the sub-sample
country per capita growth rate life exp. life exp. gini index
GDP (1965-98) at birth '80 at birth '98
Angola 701 41 47
Benin 921 0.1 48 53
Burkina Faso 519 0.9 44 44 48.2
Burundi 532 0.9 47 42 33.3
Central African Republic 585 -1.2 46 44 61.3
Chad 412 -0.6 42 48
Djibouti 370 50
Guinea 775 40 47 40.3
Guinea-Bissau 698 -0.1 39 44 56.2
Malawi 519 0.5 44 42
Mali 531 -0.1 42 50 50.5
Mozambique 760 0.5 44 45 39.6
Niger 505 -2.5 42 46 50.5
Rwanda 756 0 46 41 28.9
Somalia 775
Tanzania 534 50 47 38.2
Uganda 554 48 42 39.2
average 614.5 -0.15 44.2 45.8 44.2
median 554 0 44 45.5 40.3
Sources:
All data (unless otherwise noted) is for the year 1990 or closest available year.
Real per capita GDP in 1985 international $: Penn World Tables (Mark 5.6)
% annual growth in per cap. GNP (1965-98): World Dev. Indicators (WDI)
life expectancy at birth in 1980: WDI 2000
life expectancy at birth in 1998: WDI 2000
Gini index (various years in the 90s): WDI 2000
• Stagnant economies: Incomes have been stagnant over long time periods. The
average annual per capita GNP growth rate between 1965-98 was -0.3% for sSA; the
corresponding ﬁgure for the growth rate of consumption during 1980-98 was -1.3%. The
median growth rate of income in our sub-sample was zero. Capturing the economic
situation of this region via a trap, as we do, seems empirically justiﬁed.
The opportunities of employment for the educated are not abundant in this region.
The average annual growth rate of industrial output for sSA in the 1990-98 period was
1.3%, compared to the 10.8% for all low income countries, and virtually unchanged
from the 1980-90 rate of 1.2% (World Development Indicators 2000). The ﬁgures for
the manufacturing output are very similar. Value added in manufacturing during 1998
was 15% of GDP, down from 16% in 1980. One would expect the wage premium
for educated labor to be very high in an economy which has a severe shortage of such
8labor. However several estimates of the premium, which we will present in detail in the
section on calibration do not exceed 2.5, which can be interpreted as indirect evidence
on lack of suitable employment opportunities for the educated.9
• High inequality: The countries in our sub-sample exhibit a high degree of inequal-
ity. The average Gini index is 44.2, with the Central African Republic having a ﬁgure
of 61.3, which is higher than that of Brazil. The average ratio of income (consump-
tion) of the top 20% of the population to the bottom 20% is a whopping 12.8 with
Guinea-Bissau and the Central African Republic having ratios of 28 and 32.5. One
should further expect the impact of the costs of education presented above to vary
with income. Indeed, the OXFAM report notes that in Tanzania, the schooling expen-
diture as a share of income for the poorest 20% of households is four times as much
as the wealthiest households; evidently, modeling income heterogeneity is important in
gaining an understanding of the condition of education in sSA.
• Health & political factors: Can the poor state of education in sSA be mostly
explained by the decrease in life expectancy brought about by the AIDS epidemic that
has ravaged the area since the 80s? After all, theory predicts that schooling moves in
the same direction as life expectancy (an increase in expectancy increases returns to
schooling by increasing the time horizon over which education costs are amortized) and
there is empirical evidence consistent with this.10 Without trivializing the epidemic
which clearly deserves it own attention, from the table presented we can see that the
average life expectancy in our sub-sample actually increased from 44 years in 1980 to
45.5 years in 1998 in spite of the decrease in life expectancy for six countries. The
percentage increase in primary school-age population since 1980 has also been the
highest in sSA. It appears that while the epidemic might contribute signiﬁcantly to
the poor state of education in the region, there are other forces at work, with the
stagnation pre-dating the crisis in several countries.11
While some of the countries in the sub-sample we concentrate have had their share of
wars and strife in the last few decades, for instance, Angola, Somalia, and Uganda,
most of them, such as Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Tanzania have been relatively free of
9The premia calculated from Bigsten et. al. (2000) are particularly low. Inequality of income measured
by the Gini index can be high even if the skill premium which incorporates earnings of the educated is low.
The income inequality presumably arises from highly skewed distribution of land and scarce capital.
10See, for instance, Kumar (forthcoming). That paper also addresses the issue of causality — an increase
in education can in turn cause an improvement in life expectancy through better understanding of nutrition
and hygiene — by using climatic variables as instruments.
11However, caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the policies we study for this region. They are
intended to work in conjunction with policies developed to address the AIDS crisis. Indeed improvements in
life expectancy can only improve the educational outcomes of the policies studied.
9turmoil. Therefore, it does not seem obvious that war and political chaos alone could
account for sSA’s stagnant condition, though political stability is clearly desirable for
economic well-being.
In summary, sSA is characterized by economic and educational stagnancy and decline,
a low quality of education, high costs of education relative to income, a high degree of
inequality, a paucity of opportunities for the educated, and low and decreasing government
expenditure per pupil on education. In the next section, we will outline a model of education
ﬁnanced mostly by families that features income heterogeneity, dropouts, and the possibility
of a trap steady state, one that will be suitable to analyze the situation of sSA countries.
2.1 Mauritius: A Success Story
The island economy of Mauritius, classiﬁed as a sub-Saharan African country, stands in
stark contrast to the countries mentioned above. We brieﬂy summarize the education and
economic condition of Mauritius since we will experiment with policies that aim to replicate
this country’s performance, at least on the educational front. In 1990, Mauritius had a per
capita GDP of $5,838, more than ten times the per capita GDP of the worst-performing sSA
countries. Its annualized growth rate between 1965 and 1998 was 3.8%. More important for
us is the data from Barro and Lee (1996) that indicates the percentage of population who
attended secondary school was 36.5% in 1990 and the percentage who completed secondary
school was 28.1%. We will therefore analyze policies for the other sSA countries that will
result in a steady state close to a 30% level of educational attainment.
While the real government current expenditure per pupil at the primary and secondary
levels have been trending downward in the worst-performing sSA countries, they have been
moving upward in Mauritius. The average primary expenditure per pupil for the sSA coun-
tries discussed above was $135.6 in 1960 in the Barro and Lee database, but only $79.8 in
1990; the average secondary expenditure per pupil declined from $1682.1 in 1960 to $339.3
in 1990. On the other hand Mauritius increased its per pupil primary expenditure from
$256 in 1960 to as high as $544 in 1980; this ﬁgure dipped to $392 in 1990, which is still
nearly ﬁve times that of the other countries. Its secondary expenditure per pupil started
out lower than the other countries at $373 in 1960 and increased to $949, nearly three times
the ﬁgure for the rest. The public education expenditure as a fraction of GDP was higher
for Mauritius in 1990 at 3.6% when compared to the average of 2.8% for the rest; the true
outlays are larger than these ﬁgures would suggest, as the ratios for the poor sSA countries
are inﬂated by their low GDPs. These data suggest exploration of education subsidies as a
policy instrument.
The opening up of Mauritius to foreign technologies and investment is also often cited as
a reason for its development (though the state of its education began to improve before the
10eﬀects of sustained openness could be felt).12 While our model primarily focuses on policies
related to education, we will be able to quantify the improvement required in the aggregate
technology in the backward sSA countries in order to stimulate economic development there
on a scale comparable to that of Mauritius.13
3 AM o d e lw i t ha nE d u c a t i o nT r a p
As mentioned earlier, we build on the model developed in Caucutt and Kumar (2003); unlike
that paper we distinguish between direct and indirect costs of education and also develop
conditions that give rise to a trap (in Section 3.1). The economy is populated by a continuum
of two-period lived agents in an overlapping generations setup. The size (measure) of each
generation is normalized to one. Agents are children in the ﬁrst period and parents in the
second. Children are born “uneducated” and the central decision of their parents is whether
or not to enroll them in school. Completion of school ensures that the child will be an
“educated” worker next period. If the child is not enrolled, or enrolled but fails (drops
out) the child will be an uneducated worker in the following period. Each of these workers
becomes a parent next period, has an uneducated child, and the economy continues. Altruism
provides the intergenerational linkage. We use “rich” and “educated” interchangeably, as we
will “poor” and “uneducated”.
At an abstract level we only need to label workers as educated or uneducated. However,
for the calibration we take the stance that all children are “born” with two years of education
(our deﬁnition of “uneducated”) and successful education involves completion of a further
eight years of schooling (our deﬁnition of “educated” is thus ten years of education). From the
data discussed in the previous section, we can see the average years of primary attainment
among the worst performing countries is 1.4 years, which motivates our baseline level of
education. Secondary schooling indicators are often used in cross-country growth studies
and completion of education at this level is considered to be the minimum level needed for a
worker to perform well in the modern economy, which motivates our deﬁnition of educated
workers.14
12See, for instance, Romer (1993) and English (1998).
13Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) focus on the other success story of Africa, Botswana. They
conjecture that the presence of institutions aligned with the interests of the elite made rich by diamond mines
is responsible for Botswana’s sucess. Mauritius appears more relevant for educational policies we consider,
and also more replicable in other countries.
14As in Galor and Zeira (1993), human capital investment is indivisible. Given that educational qualiﬁcation
is viewed by ﬁrms and other economic agents in discrete terms — primary complete, secondary complete, etc.
— this assumption seems intuitive. Moreover, Bigsten et. al. (2000) report that the return to education in
ﬁve African countries is highly non-linear, with the return to primary education as low as 2% for Cameroon,
but with a substantially higher return for secondary education (a minimum of 7%); this further lends support
for modeling secondary schooling as the minimum acceptable level of education.
11Children diﬀer in their ability to become educated. In addition to innate talent, these
ability diﬀerences are intended to capture unmodeled heterogeneity in all those traits that
make a family “well-functioning”. We assume that, conditional on being enrolled, a child
with ability a completes education with probability π (a); with probability (1 − π(a)),t h e
child drops out and becomes an uneducated worker. The probability function satisﬁes:
π(0) = 0, 0 <π (a) 6 1, ∀ a ∈ (0,1],π
0
(a) > 0, ∀ a ∈ [0,1].15 The function π c a nb eu s e dt o
capture the quality of the educational system. Even low ability students in several developed
countries are given a meaningful education through special programs; one would therefore
expect the π functions for the developed economies to dominate those of poor economies
such as those in sSA.
Let F (·) denote the distribution function for ability on the support [0,1],a n df (·) the
corresponding density function. The distribution is identical across types and within parents
of the same type; ability draws are independent of each other.
Enrolling a child involves a real cost of ed units of consumption. This is intended to
capture direct costs such as tuition, uniforms, and other school material. A parent cannot
borrow to ﬁnance her child’s education. The economies we are studying have poorly devel-
oped capital markets and the liquidity constraint assumption seems relevant, especially for
ﬁnancing education.16 If a child is not enrolled she can work and add w to the family’s con-
sumption. We have in mind tasks such as tending livestock, fetching water, and helping in
the ﬁelds — activities in which children in poor countries are typically involved — in addition
to supplying labor outside the family. These activities are not readily valued by the market
wage. For this reason, and for sake of simplicity we have modeled the child’s contribution
as a ﬁxed quantity unaﬀected by market conditions. If the child is enrolled in school, she
can contribute only ϕw to the family, where 0 <ϕ<1. Deﬁne e ≡ ed +( 1− ϕ)w to be
the total cost of education, which includes both the direct and the indirect cost. Education
costs could be subsidized to the level s; if so, it is netted out of the cost e. We will present
the analytical discussions without the subsidy and introduce the subsidy explicitly when we
discuss calibration.
Let the fraction (measure) of educated workers entering the labor force at any time be
denoted by ne. This is the only aggregate state variable in this economy. Let e we (ne) denote
the wage earnings of an educated parent as a function of the aggregate state ne,a n dl e t
e wu (ne) denote the wage of an uneducated parent. Deﬁne, wj(ne) ≡ e wj (ne)+w, (j = e,u),
15When we calibrate the model and conduct policy experiments, we use diﬀerent probability functions for
the children of educated and uneducated parents, πe (a) >π u (a), ∀ a [0,1] to capture unmodeled advantages
that children of rich parents have in pre-school care and in schooling.
16Jacoby and Skouﬁas (1997) and Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2002) provide micro evidence on the existence
of credit constraints in developing countries. The ﬁrst study ﬁnds that school enrollment is sensitive to
transitory income shocks in Indian farm households, while the second ﬁnds income sensitivity in the supply
of child labor in Tanzanian households.
12to be the potential (or “full”) earnings of a household of type j. It is then easy to see that
the earnings of a household that does not enroll its child is wj(ne) and one that does is
wj(ne) − e (which amounts to e wj + ϕw − ed).
Workers inelastically supply their unitary time endowment. Since we expect the tax rate
required to ﬁnance education to be low, not modeling labor distortion is likely to be a less
than egregious omission.
Consider a parent of type j, (j = e,u), who has a child of ability a.I f Vj (a;ne) is the
























, j = e,u, is the child’s expected utility, which
depends on whether the child enters adulthood as a educated or uneducated worker. We
take β to be an intergenerational discount (altruism) factor, and the decision is between
enrolling and not enrolling. The aggregate state that will prevail when the child enters the
labor force is denoted by n0
e. All parents posit that the law of motion for the aggregate state
follows n
0
e = Φ(ne), which they assume to be outside their control. We assume a standard
utility function, with u
0
> 0,a n du
00
< 0.
There is a single consumption good produced using educated and uneducated labor as
inputs. The CES production function is:
Y = A[θ(Ne + γNu)
ν +( 1− θ)(Nu + εNe)ν]
1
ν , (2)
where 0 <γ ,ε ,ν<1, and γ 6 ε.17 The ﬁrst term within the square brackets can be thought
of as “brain” and the second term as “brawn”. Here, Ne is the number of educated workers
employed by the ﬁrm, while Nu is the number of uneducated workers employed. Educated
workers are the primary suppliers of “brain”. The weight of uneducated workers in this
factor, γ, is small and keeps wages bounded even at a trap. Both types of workers contribute
toward “brawn”. The mere hiring of a particular type of worker contributes to both factors
in the proportion shown above. In a competitive labor market, the wage rates e we and e wu
would be the appropriate marginal product and decreasing in Ne and Nu respectively.
We characterize the behavior of parents in detail in Caucutt and Kumar (2003) and
provide only a summary of the results here and move quickly to the new results on a trap
steady state, the focus of this paper. An examination of (1) suggests that parents’ decisions
a r ed r i v e nb yat h r e s h o l da b i l i t y—ap a r e n to ft y p ej enrolls her child if a > a∗
j (ne),a n d
17See Stokey (1996) for a similar production function.
13does not otherwise. For a parent whose child is at the threshold ability, we can examine the
two options of (1) and write:
βπ(a∗
j (ne))Λ(Φ(ne)) 6 gj (ne),j= e,u (3)
w h e r ew ed e ﬁne Λ(ne) ≡ EVe (ne) − EVu (ne), as the value of education, and gj (ne) ≡
u(wj(ne)) − u(wj(ne) − e), as the utility cost to a parent of enrolling a child. The above
expression holds with equality if a∗
j (ne) < 1. If it holds as an inequality even when a∗
j(ne)=








, is then zero.
A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned in the usual way as a collection of functions e wj(ne),
a∗
j (ne), j = l, i, Λ(ne),a n dΦ(ne),o n[0,1], such that the parents’ optimality conditions
and production optimality conditions are satisﬁed, the labor market clears, and Φ(ne) and











From the labor market clearing condition of Ne = ne,N u =1− ne, and the production
f u n c t i o n( 2 )w eh a v ee w
0
e (ne) and thus w
0
e (ne) < 0, and e w
0
u (ne) and thus w
0
u (ne) > 0.
Together with the concavity of u,t h i si m p l i e sg
0
e (ne) > 0 and g
0
u (ne) < 0. Given the liquidity
constraint, the intuitive result that the richer parents can aﬀord to enroll even children of
lower ability while the poorer parents can aﬀord to enroll only higher ability children follows
from (3); that is, a∗
e (ne) <a ∗
u (ne),f o rne ∈ [0,1].T h i s a l s o i m p l i e s a∗
e (ne) < 1. Put
diﬀerently, the enrollment rates are higher among the rich.
Deﬁnition 1 A steady state is a competitive equilibrium with ne = n∗




On a steady state, the wages, reservation abilities, expected utilities, and the fraction
(measure) of educated workers are all constant over time. Manipulating the consistency













e(ne))u(we(ne)) + (1 − F(a∗
e(ne)))u(we(ne) − e)] −
[F(a∗
u(ne))u(wu(ne)) + (1 − F(a∗
u(ne)))u(wu(ne) − e)]. (6)
Here, x is extra contemporaneous (ex ante, expected) utility an educated parent gets, taking
into account the endogenous eﬀect of a higher wage parent having a higher probability of
14enrolling a child. The value of being educated has two components — a contemporaneous
utility gain and a discounted future value. Equations (3) through (5) are four functional
equations in the four functions Λ, Φ, a∗
e,a n da∗
u, and completely describe the dynamics of
the model. When ne is replaced by n∗
e,we can solve for the four steady state quantities.
Intuitively one would expect the value of education to decrease with the measure of
educated people. One would similarly expect the measure of educated workers in the next
period to increase with the measure of educated workers this period. In Caucutt and Kumar
(2003) we provide conditions that ensure Λ(ne) is decreasing and Φ(ne) is increasing.
We will see below that the dynamic behavior of the economy around the origin is governed
mainly by the utility cost of uneducated rather than educated parents. Rich parents always
enroll a positive fraction of their children and especially so when their wages are very high
(ne → 0). But given that they are a very small fraction of the labor force when ne is close to
zero, their behavior matters little to the dynamics of the economy. Whether the fraction of
educated workers continues to grow in the vicinity of ne =0 , and if so whether it grows at a
rate that can sustain a long run equilibrium with a positive fraction of such workers, depend
on the behavior of the poor parents. This insight would be obscured by a representative
agent model.18
Deﬁnition 2 A trap is a locally stable steady state at n∗
e =0 .
We turn to a formal analysis next, and provide a suﬃcient condition for a trap to occur.
3.1 Conditions for a Trap
Lemma 3 A necessary condition for a trap is a∗
u (0) = 1 (the poor do not enroll their
children). This condition is suﬃcient if additionally, a∗
u =1in a neighborhood of ne =0 .
Proof. First we prove necessity. Suppose a trap exists; therefore, Φ(0) = 0.F r o m( 4 ) ,
we can see that at ne =0 ,w eh a v eΦ(0) =
R 1
a∗
u(0) π(a)dF(a). Given the assumptions on π,
Φ(0) = 0 only if a∗
u(0) = 1.
Next we show suﬃciency. If a∗
u (0) = 1, (4) implies Φ(0) = 0 so n∗
e =0is indeed a
steady state of the dynamic system. Since a∗
u =1also in Nr(0), for some ne = ε in this





0 π(a)dF(a) <εgiven the
assumptions on π. Φ(ne) <n e in the neighborhood of ne =0implies the steady state is
locally stable.
18It is clear that the ﬁxed nature of the goods cost of education is responsible for the trap. One could
envision an alternate setup in which the time cost of an old agent (the “teacher”) is the cost of education.
If the teacher is the parent of the child herself, the cost of educating the poor would be very low when the
wages of the poor are low, and a trap is unlikely. However, if the cost of educating the child is the time cost
of an educated worker, which seems more plausible, a trap is likely to obtain. In fact, the situation would
be exacerbated since the wages of the educated are highest when the wages of the uneducated are at their
lowest.
15What are the conditions that could yield a∗
u =1in Nr(0) and hence a trap? It is useful
to ﬁr s tc o n s i d e rl i n e a ru t i l i t y ,u(c)=c, since the condition is very intuitive in this case and
will help us better understand the condition for the more general isoelastic utility function.
Moreover, equation (3) implies that a∗
e = a∗
u when utility is linear, and the model has the
ﬂavor of a representative agent model, in enrollment if not in income.
Lemma 4 When u(c)=c, as u ﬃcient condition for a∗
u (0) = 1 a n dh e n c eat r a pi se>
β (we (0) − wu (0)).
Proof. With u(w)=w, the dynamic system becomes:
ge = gu = e; a∗
e = a∗
u ≡ a∗





Λ(ne)=x(ne)=we (ne) − wu (ne).
The value to being educated does not have a dynamic component here and the economy
jumps to the steady state immediately. For this steady state to be zero (i.e. a trap), as
argued above a∗ needs to be one; that is, no one is enrolled. So a suﬃcient condition for a
trap, from (7) is β · 1 · (we (0) − wu (0)) <e ,or:
e>β(we (0) − wu (0)). (8)
Since the economy jumps to the zero steady state right away from any starting ne, stability
readily obtains.
Since we is decreasing in ne and wu is increasing, the wage gap between the educated
and the uneducated workers is maximum at zero. The above condition states that if the cost
of education is greater than the maximum possible discounted gain, a trap will result. In
other words, if the maximum possible discounted return to investment in education is less
than one a trap results.
Lemma 5 For a more general utility function, as u ﬃcient condition for a∗
u =1in a neigh-







Proof. As mentioned earlier, it can be shown that a∗
e (ne) <a ∗
u (ne).F r o m( 6 )w ec a n
therefore show (dropping the argument ne for notational simplicity):
x<[F(a∗
e)u(we)+( 1− F(a∗





e)(u(we) − u(wu)) + (1 − F(a∗
e))(u(we − e) − u(wu − e)).
16Given the concavity of u, it follows that u(we −e)−u(wu −e) >u (we)−u(wu).T h e r e f o r e ,
in the above convex combination we have:
x<u (we − e) − u(wu − e)
<u (we (0) − e) − u(wu (0) − e),
given w
0
e (ne) < 0 and w
0
u (ne) > 0. (Together with the concavity of u this also implies that
the largest gu can be is u(wu (0))−u(wu (0)−e).) The dynamic factor in (5) can be bounded
by β
R 1
0 π(a)dF(a), and therefore the whole expression can be used to write:
Λ(ne) <





The observation made earlier that Λ(ne) is decreasing and Φ(ne) is increasing, which implies
Λ(ne) > Λ(Φ(ne)) has been used to derive this. From (5), a suﬃcient condition for a∗
u(0) = 1
is:
u(wu (0)) − u(wu (0) − e)







By evaluating the numerator at a positive value of ε in Nr (0), we can ensure a∗
u =1in a
neighborhood of ne =0 .
To better understand this result, note that when we use u(c)=c in the above expression,
we retrieve the condition e>β(we (0) − wu (0)) as in the earlier lemma (noting that the




e(ne) π(a)dF(a),s i n c ea∗
e = a∗
u ≡
a∗). The numerator of the left hand side in the general condition above is now the utility
cost of education to the poor parent instead of the goods cost found in the condition for
linear utility. This cost was the same for both types under linear utility, as it would have
been in a representative agent model. The contribution then of the heterogeneous agent
setup is to identify the cost squarely with the poor agents in the economy. The denominator
of the left hand side is now the utility gap of the two types of agents (adjusted for the cost
of education) instead of the wage gap; it can be viewed as the utility gain from education.
It can be shown that the left hand side of (9) is increasing in e and decreasing in we (0)
for a given wu (0); the right hand side is decreasing in β. Therefore, as in the linear utility
case, the above trap condition is more likely to be satisﬁed when the cost of education
is high, the wage gap is low, and the discount factor is low. Additionally, the curvature
of the utility function also matters now. For instance, with an isoelastic utility function
u(c)=c1−σ
1−σ ,σ> 0, (with the σ =1case interpreted as log(c)), the left hand side is
increasing in σ. Therefore, the likelihood of a trap increases with the curvature of the utility
function. Thus the above suﬃcient condition identiﬁes all the intuitive forces that make a
trap more likely in our setup.
174C a l i b r a t i o n
Recall our deﬁnition of educated and uneducated workers — an uneducated worker has two
years of education and an educated worker has ten years of education. In this section we
describe the choice of model parameters that allows us to produce outcomes that are broadly
consistent with the sSA countries being close to a trap; that is, with the fraction of workers
with education beyond two years close to zero. The quality of data on these countries is not
comparable to that of the US. By targeting the average performance of a group of countries
discussed in Section 2, we hope to avoid the pitfalls of calibrating to a single country with a
particularly low quality of data or one that suﬀers from an idiosyncratic institutional failure.
The aim is to get a set of parameters with which it is sensible to conduct policy analysis.
We assume agents are born at age 6 and are “young” until the age of 25; they become
adults at the age of 26, have a child, and die at the age of 45. The model period is thus 20
years. The life-span corresponds closely to the life expectancy of the sSA countries considered
(see Table 2).
We start by assuming values for certain parameters that are commonly used in the
literature. The generational discount factor is set at β =0 .6676, which corresponds to a
yearly discount factor of 0.98 compounded over 20 years. We set ν =0 .35, which corresponds
to an elasticity of substitution between educated and uneducated labor of 1.54. Autor, Katz,
and Krueger (1998) report that the emerging consensus on the elasticity between skilled
and unskilled labor is approximately 1.4 to 1.5.19 In the absence of direct evidence, we set
ε =0 .1, (each unit of skilled labor counts 10% of unskilled labor toward brawn) and leave
γ<εas a free parameter; this makes our choice of ε a normalization of sorts.
We assume u(c)=c1−σ
1−σ ,σ> 0. As we have seen in the previous section, the likelihood of
a trap increases with σ. We use this result and existing arguments for a negative relationship
between relative risk aversion and wealth (see, for instance, Ogaki and Zhang (2001)), to set
σ at a higher value of 3.5 instead of the usual 2. We assume a uniform ability distribution
in [0,1]; that is, F (a)=a.
The remaining parameters are particular to the production functions for output and hu-
man capital. They are chosen to broadly match target data on education costs, the wage
premium, and enrollment and dropout rates. The erratic nature of data availability, their
variability across sources, and the processing required to map available data into correspond-
ing model equivalents warrant a detailed discussion of these targets.
Skill premium: Bils and Klenow (2000) present Mincer regression coeﬃcients on schooling
for a few sSA countries: 0.207 for Cote d’Ivoire, 0.126 for Botswana, and 0.067 for Tanzania.
When we compute exp(coeff ∗ 8) for these three countries, we obtain premia of 5.24, 2.74,
19Their deﬁnition of skill, however, corresponds to college education.
18and 1.71 respectively.20 When the ﬁgures reported in Bigsten et. al. (2000) are used
to compute the premium for our education deﬁnition, we obtain a value of 1.42.21 The
World Development Indicators (2000) states that the ratio of manufacturing to agricultural
wage was 5 for Botswana during 1980-84 and 2.36 during 1995-99.22 Verner (1999) presents
evidence that the wage gap is 56% in Ghana between secondary graduates and those with
no education, and 186% if the education is at the university level — premia of 1.56 and 2.86
respectively. Bredie and Beeharry (1998) cite evidence from Mason and Khandker (1996)
that when hourly wages in the formal sector are used as a measure of beneﬁts, the private
return to education is 7.9% in Tanzania; this translates into a premium of 1.9 when calculated
as above. The premium therefore spans the rather wide range of 1.42 to 5.24 for the African
countries on which we have evidence.
Parental cost of education: We next turn to the direct cost of education and subsidies.
Ablo and Reinikka (1998) present data on parental and government spending in Uganda
for 1991 through 1995. Parental expenses include tuition, Parent-Teacher Association levies
and salaries; governmental expenses include capitation grants and salaries. For instance, in
1991 total parental expenditure per pupil was 9,498 Ugandan Shillings, and governmental
expenditure was only 3,590. In 1995 the ﬁgures were 12,781 and 8,676, reﬂecting a decrease
in the share of expenditure borne by parents.23 In conjunction with the per capita GNP
ﬁgures, we compute the annual share of income that is spent on education and the parental
share of this cost, averaged over 1991-95. If we denote per capita income by y, then λ1 ≡
total direct cost
y =8 .1%,λ 2 ≡
govt. cost
y =2 .7%, and therefore λ1 − λ2 =
parent’s cost
y =5 .4%.




For details on indirect costs, we turn to Bredie and Beeharry (1998), who present time
use data of school-aged children in Madagascar and conclude that the opportunity cost for
boys in school is 20 hours per week, with an adjusted measure for girls a bit higher.24 This
ﬁgure is in line with the 21 hours per week reported by Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2002)
for Tanzania. We assume this is half the adult work week; non-schoolgoing children work
20Mincerian regressions use log wages, which explains the exponentiation. The number of years of schooling
that is relevant for us is 8. See Knight and Sabot (1990), Chapter 13, for the need to exercise caution in
interpreting return estimates that ignore the eﬀects of policy-induced wage diﬀerences between the public
and private sectors.
21We use their coeﬃcients from regression (3) in Table 7 to compute wages for 2 and 8 years of education.
Their production function approach would yield lower values.
22See Table 2.6.
23See their Table 5.
24See their Annex A. They compare hours spent by schoolgoing and non-schoolgoing children in several
categories — water collection, ﬁrewood collection, household tasks, and independent agricultural and non-
agricultural activities — to arrive at the opportunity costs.
19half an adult week and schoolgoing children work none. We impute the average wage in the
economy to this time; in other words, we set w such that it is equal to 0.5y,w h e r ey is the
average wage earnings.25
Consider the income of a family in which the child does not go to school. The present
value of the parent’s annual income y over 20 years at an 8% rate of discounting is 10.6y. The
present value of the child’s income is half this at 5.3y. I ft h ef a m i l yd o e ss e n dt h ec h i l dt o
school, the present value of the annual parental cost of education (λ1 − λ2)y over the eight
schooling years is calculated as 6.2(λ1 − λ2)y. If the child goes to school, it is assumed that
after the ﬁrst 8 years, the child can work the rest of his youth years with annual earnings of
0.5y; that is, we assume that the increased earnings on account of education are not realized
until adulthood.26 The present value of these earnings works out to be 2.2y. Therefore, we
calculate:
ϕ =
Earnings of schoolgoing child





We calculate the direct education expenditure net of government subsidies as a fraction of







Enrollment and dropout rates: Finally we calculate the enrollment and dropout rates
to target. A “naive” measure of enrollment rate can be obtained by taking a simple average
of the primary and secondary enrollment for each country in Table 1 and then taking the
average across countries. This works out to 31.8%. However, this does not exactly correspond
to the model enrollment rate where the education is really from the beginning of the third
year to that of the eighth year. Using the intake rate at the ﬁrst year and the year-to-year
survival rates from the World Education Indicators, it is possible to calculate enrollment
rates conditional on students surviving the ﬁrst two years of education. The average of this
enrollment data is 22.9%. The “naive” dropout rate can be obtained as above as an average
of the primary dropout rate and secondary repeat rate (which we use as a proxy for the
secondary dropout rate on which data is not readily available); it works out to 32.3% for
the countries we are interested in. We can also calculate the dropout rate conditional on
students surviving the ﬁrst two years of their education as 13.5%. Since data for this latter
calculation is not available for all countries, with the poorest performing countries most
likely to have missing data, this dropout rate is likely to be underestimated.
25Note that at the trap y = wu.
26By making this assumption we attempt to account for the experience premium which we have not explic-
itly modeled. If the eﬀect of education is realized in the ﬁrst period of an individual’s life itself, ϕ is likely
to be higher. However, the earnings of those students who fail to become educated will be unaﬀected by the
timing assumption. We discuss the importance of ϕ in the section on sensitivity analysis.
20We parametrize the human capital production function with the properties of π we had
assumed earlier: π(0) = 0,π
0
(a) > 0. We now allow for the possibility that these functions
can diﬀer across the two types of families, to account for the advantages educated families
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This convex-concave parametric form was chosen because it allows us to better match the
enrollment and dropout rates in the vicinity of the trap. It must be emphasized that such
a shape is not required to get a trap in the ﬁrst place. The curvature of the utility function
and costs play a bigger role in causing the trap. We normalize ke =1 .
To summarize, the seven parameters that remain — production parameters (A, θ, γ),
the earnings of a non-schoolgoing child w, expenditure variables (ed,s), and the probability
(human capital production) function parameters (ku) — are chosen to broadly match the
following seven targets:








e we/e wu 1.42-5.24
Enrollment rate 22.9-31.8%
Dropout rate 13.5-32.3%
The parameters arising from this calibration are summarized below:
Production : A =2 ,θ=0 .48,ν=0 .35,ε =0 .1,γ=0 .05,
Preference : β =0 .6676,σ=3 .5,
Education : ed =0 .0326,s =0 .0109,F(a)=a, w =0 .3439,ϕ =0 .415,k e =1 ,k u =0 .85.
The resulting total cost of education parameter, e (= ed +( 1− ϕ)w), is 0.234; in other
words, the direct cost is only 14% of the total costs. Therefore, the return to investment
in education is dramatically diﬀerent when indirect costs are ignored than when they are
included — by a factor of 7.18 (= e/ed). Low enrollment in the face of high returns to
education calculated from Mincerian regressions is seen as a puzzle; Psacharopolous (1994),
for instance, reports an average rate of return of 13.4% in sSA for the ﬁrst few years of
education. Appleton, Hoddinott, and Mackinnon (1996) and Bigsten et. al. (2000) question
the validity of such high reported returns; therefore, one approach to resolving the puzzle is to
question its very existence. Focusing on the return to investment in education and factoring
21indirect costs, which our framework allows us to do, provides another possible resolution of
the puzzle; this return is much higher when calculated using only the direct cost of education
than the total cost which includes children’s contribution to family consumption. In other
words the assumption implicit in the Mincerian interpretation that, “...for each educational
level, the opportunity cost is the wage that would have been obtained with the education level
one below the completed level,” is questionable in a setup where non-market contributions
play a big role.27
With these parameters, a trap results. That is, n∗
e =0 . The ﬁrst four of the above targets
are directly met. A skill premium of 4.96 results, which is within the above-mentioned range
seen in data, though close to the upper end. Exactly at the trap, there is no enrollment;
a∗
u =1 , and even though a∗
e =0 .12 < 1, there is a zero measure of these educated people at
the trap. Therefore, we examine the average dropout and enrollment rates in the “vicinity”
of the trap (ne =0 .00 − 0.15), with the interpretation that these economies are headed
toward a trap if they are not already in it. The enrollment rate is in the range of 0 to 21%,
which is a bit lower than the range given above but in the ballpark of the enrollment rate
calculated conditional on students surviving past the second year, while the dropout rate is
in the range of 24 to 43%, overlapping considerably with the range seen in data.28
We assume that the government education expenses are met by taxing all workers. The
government balances its budget according to:
[ne(1 − F(a∗
e)) + (1 − ne)(1 − F(a∗
u))] s =( ne e we +( 1− ne)e wu)τ. (10)
Any student, rich or poor, who goes to school gets subsidies and all workers are taxed; this
is the only type of tax-and-subsidy scheme we will consider throughout this paper.29
In the next section we compare the eﬃcacy of various policies in prying this economy out
of the trap.
27The quote is from Bigsten et. al. (2000).
28The aggregate enrollment and dropout rates are calculated using the following formulae:
enr. rate = ne (1 − a
∗
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29Need-based subsidy is not widely prevalent in basic education, especially in poor countries, so assuming
uniform subsidies appears reasonable. Progressive taxes would be a non-starter at the trap, where there are
no rich people. One could assume progressive taxes and the ability to borrow abroad initially (when everyone
is poor) as a way of prying the economy from the trap, but uniform taxes seems a simpler starting point.
225 Policy Experiments
We consider the following policy alternatives, suggested by popular policy discussions as
well as by the economic forces we have captured in our model, to spur development in sSA
— a tax and subsidy scheme, foreign aid, abolition of child labor, enacting and enforcing
a compulsory education law, and infrastructural improvements that lead to an increase in
A. We treat the welfare-maximizing case of the ﬁrst alternative as our benchmark policy.
For the remaining alternatives, we ﬁrst consider the alternate policy in isolation to study it
in detail and later adjust the subsidy level so as to equate equilibrium expenditure to that
in the tax and subsidy scheme that maximizes transitional welfare; this allows us to make
“revenue neutral” comparisons.
In all experiments, we hold the π functions at their trap conﬁguration; that is, we do not
make any adjustment for the quality of the education system. There are several reasons for
this move. We do not have enough data on quality, especially from this region, to calibrate π
according to the level of development. We also expect the quality of educational institutions
to move upward more sluggishly than enrollment.30 In fact, the increase in enrollment we
expect our policies to induce would worsen the already high student-teacher ratios in these
economies.
5.1 A Tax and Subsidy Scheme
The lesson learned from the suﬃcient conditions, (8) and (9), is that high education costs
can cause an economy to move to a trap in the long run. At the prevailing subsidy level,
as calibrated above, the net educational cost is high enough to cause a trap. An obvious
policy alternative is to ﬁnd a subsidy level that can cause the economy to not only emerge
from the trap, but also results in a desirable long run outcome. As mentioned in Section 2.1,
one economy we aim for is one with n∗
e =0 .3, which is roughly the education attainment
in Mauritius. We will assume that the government budget constraint, (10), holds at every
instance and seek the subsidy level s that will cause such a steady state to be attained. The
l e v e lo fs u b s i d yi sh e l dc o n s t a n t ,a n dt h et a xr a t eτ is varied so as to balance the government
budget.
Before we search for the subsidy that guarantees such a steady state, we present a graph
of the transition function Φ for various subsidy levels in Figure 1. We can see from this plot
that the subsidy has to be high enough for the economy to get on to a transition path that
will take it to a non-trap steady state; for instance, s =0 .015 (which is 6.4% of the total
cost and 46% of the direct cost) will not get the economy out of the trap. In particular, note
30Hanushek (1995), for instance, concludes that correcting ineﬃciencies in the educational system is not
simple: “There is no blueprint for a model school that can be reproduced and handed out to policymakers,
and such a blueprint is unlikely to be developed in the near future.”
23that subsidizing the direct cost of ed =0 .0326 alone will get the economy out of the trap,
though the resulting fraction of educated workers, n∗
e, is only 13.8%.
Figure 1
Transition Function — Φ(ne) vs ne















Since everyone pays taxes, but only families who enroll their children get beneﬁts, there
is a redistribution from the poor families with low ability children to poor families with
high ability children in the initial period while the economy is still at the trap. This is the
fundamental force that allows this policy to pry the economy out of the trap. Redistribution
is typically viewed in terms of the rich and the poor, but in this context it is the redistribution
from families with low ability children to those with high ability children that is important.31
Once the process of development starts, and there are some educated rich parents in the
31Of course, legally mandating school attendance and enforcing such a law, will also be able to provide this
impetus. We study compulsory education in a latter subsection.
24economy, the redistribution could potentially be from the low to high ability families of both
types, as well as between the rich and the poor.
In practice it might not be necessary to levy new taxes to subsidize education. For
instance, military expenditure as a fraction of GNP was 3.1% in sSA in 1992; diverting part
of it to education might suﬃce.32
We compare the outcomes in the new and old steady states in Table 3.
Table 3
A simple tax and subsidy scheme
Variable Interpretation 1. Trap 2. subsidy 1 3. subsidy 2
n∗
e Fraction of educated workers 0% 30% 38%
s Subsidy level 0.0109 0.090 0.157
τ∗ Tax rate 0% 3.2% 7.0%




u Skill premium 4.96 1.54 1.28
ne (1 − a∗
e)+( 1− ne)(1− a∗






u) Dropout rate 0% 19.2% 19.7%
ωss SS welfare (cons. equiv.) — 20.3% 23.6%
ωtran Trans. welfare (cons. equiv.) — 6.6% 8.1%
As seen in column numbered 2, a subsidy level of 0.09, which is 38.5% of total costs, is
needed to take the economy to a steady state of n∗
e =0 .3. In other words, it is not enough
for the government to subsidize only the direct costs of education, which is only 14% of the
total cost; it would have to defray part of the child’s contribution to the family income that
is lost by sending the child to school. At steady state a tax rate of 3.2% needs to be levied
on all workers to meet the cost of subsidies. Since all workers are taxed at the same rate, the
ratio of government expenditure to GDP will also be 3.2%. This is close to the 3.6% ﬁgure
cited earlier for Mauritius and thus appears to be an achievable target.33 As mentioned in
the introduction, the closeness of the model outcome to data from a country that was not
originally part of the calibration, lends support to the validity of the calibrated model as
well as to the use of education subsidies in reviving a stagnant economy.
This policy will increase output by close to 50%. The ratio of the subsidy (expenditure
per pupil) to per capita GDP is 8.75%. The increase in ne will decrease e we and increase e wu
to cause the premium to drop considerably, to 1.54; most of this is driven by the drop in
32See 2000 World Development Indicators, Table 5.7.
33The Oxfam report cited earlier states that a “minimum requirement for progressing toward the 2015
target,” of achieving universal primary education is education expenditure amounting to 3% of GDP. Our
simulations show that at a ﬁgure close to this, the enrollment rate is not 100%. Simulations presented later
show that about 7% of GDP has to be spent on education to ensure 100% enrollment.
25skilled wages.34 The economywide enrollment rate is 36.2%, which masks the relatively high
enrollment of 61% for educated parents. The dropout rate is close to 20%.
In the second to last row, we present the equivalent increase in consumption each agent
would have to be given in the trap in order to make an aggregate welfare measure, in
which current generations are equally weighted and a discount factor of β is used for future
generations, the same as that in the new steady state. Each household needs to be given
20.3% more consumption every period in the trap. When the costs of transition (increased
taxes and educational investment when uneducated workers’ wages are still low) is taken
into account, the gain in welfare is much lower; as seen in the last row, it amounts to an
equivalent increase of 6.6% of the trap consumption, which is still very signiﬁcant. The
economy is very close to the steady state in four to ﬁve model periods.35
Next we seek the subsidy level that maximizes the transitional welfare. An increased
subsidy increases enrollment and succeeds in moving a greater fraction of the population
toward the higher utility educated category. However, higher taxes needed to ﬁnance this
subsidy drain income from liquidity constrained parents who are poor during the transition
and yet invest more in education in the aggregate. These opposing forces suggest that there
is a subsidy level that is optimal. As shown in column 3, a subsidy level of s =0 .157
(about 67% of total educational cost), maximizes transitional welfare.36 At this higher
subsidy level, the new steady state tax rate is higher at 7%; output inches up and the
premium drops further, to 1.28. Enrollment is substantially higher, at 47.2%, which results
in a steady state educational attainment of 38%. Both the steady state and transitional
consumption equivalents are higher, at 23.6% and 8.1% respectively, with the latter at its
maximum possible value. Henceforth, we shall refer to this level of subsidy as our benchmark
policy.
The main conclusions we draw from this experiment is that a “simple” tax and subsidy
scheme, can alter the transition function and put the economy on a path toward develop-
ment. Such a scheme increases welfare signiﬁcantly even when transition costs are taken into
account; the subsidies would however have to go beyond direct costs and cover part of the
indirect costs as well.37
34Bils and Klenow (2000) do not report the Micerian coeﬃcient for Mauritius, but do present data on
Malaysia, a country of comparable educational and economic development. Their coeﬃcient of 0.094 translates
to a skill premium of 2.1 in our context. Therefore, we might be overestimating the drop in the premium.
35The fact that the absolute welfare ﬁgures are high is interesting in their own right; however, the relative
ordering of policies according to welfare is probably more important for our purpose.
36If taxes were distortionary, this maximum would occur at a lower level of subsidy.
37The Progresa program instituted in Mexico does subsidize indirect costs.
265.1.1 Political Economy Considerations
A natural question to ask at this juncture is why we do not see such schemes put in place in
practice. Even though ours is not a model of political economy, our simulations allow us to
speculate on this question.
There is a drop in wages of the educated, e we, of about 61% going from the trap to the
ﬁrst subsidy level and a drop of 67% to the second subsidy level. Even though the measure
of educated workers in the trap is vanishingly small, one can still examine whether such
workers would prefer to be in a trap or in the above steady state in column 3. We ﬁnd (in
ﬁgures omitted for brevity) that they prefer the trap, and in all experiments the currently
uneducated prefer subsidies more than the currently educated do, at least across steady
states. There is therefore an incentive for the educated “elite”, who often occupy key policy
making positions in these countries, to not subsidize education and preserve the monopoly
they enjoy for their children who are more likely to be educated. If this incentive eﬀectively
causes subsidization to be blocked, the economy will remain in a trap.38
Why would the poor who do not enroll their children support the taxation scheme? We
ﬁnd that this segment of the population also beneﬁts from the subsidy scheme. A poor
household with the ablest possible child (a =1 ), which will enrolls its child for sure, needs
an equivalent consumption measure of 8.6% at the trap to equate welfare to the one in the
subsidy scheme. A household with a low ability child who is not enrolled also prefer the
scheme; their equivalent consumption measure is 7.7%. Even though the unenrolled child
will stay poor next period, since the wage of the uneducated increases, the expected value to
being poor increases and this feeds into the welfare of today’s parent.39 The subsidy scheme
which improves the future economic condition of the low ability individuals also provides
present-day parents insurance against their grandchildren’s ability, partially completing a
market that has been assumed to not exist.
5.2 The Question of Foreign Aid
The Oxfam report mentioned in the introduction recommends an increase in foreign aid to
sSA countries as well as an increase in the portion of this aid devoted to basic education.
Indeed several of the sSA countries already receive considerable amounts of foreign aid.
Given their low GDPs, aid as a percentage of GDP for some of these countries is high; it
38The decrease in relative wages of the skilled, that is, the skill premium, is more crucial for this explanation.
A simulatenous increase in total factor productivity could increase absolute skilled wages even as increased
education attainment decreases the skill premium. Absolute wages for the skilled in Mauritius, for instance,
have not decreased relative to other sSA economies that are closer to a trap.
39Knight and Sabot (1990) are pessimistic that an expanded education system would improve intergenera-
tional mobility, but do ﬁnd an increase in the absolute wages of the less educated in Kenya, due to productivity
gains attributable to the expansion. See their Chapter 10.
27is 5.65% for Malawi, 7.65% for Mali, 5.38% for Niger, 4.44% for Somalia, and 5.86% for
Tanzania.40 However, not all of this aid is likely to be devoted to basic education. Moreover,
international outlays for foreign aid have been dwindling. Burnside and Dollar (2000) state,
“...in 1997 OECD countries gave less, as a share of GNP, than they have in decades.” They
also ﬁnd that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with good policies,
but little eﬀect on those with poor policies.
The previous experiment suggests that even an economy locked into a trap need not be
dependent on foreign aid to trigger development. It is welfare improving to tax workers
and raise the funds for subsidizing education locally. Indeed one of the complaints donors of
foreign aid have is that the funds are frittered away and rarely reach intended targets. When
the funds are generated within the poor country via taxation the chances of local monitoring
and political accountability of funds might improve.
Despite these considerations, we conduct an experiment that mimics foreign aid. The
workers in the poor country are not taxed; instead foreign aid is expected to cover the
subsidies that are needed to take the economy to the same steady state as the benchmark
policy of n∗
e =0 .38. The elimination of taxes causes little change to the economic aggregates
such as output, the skill premium, and enrollment rates.41 The subsidy level is a bit lower
than before at 0.152; workers earn slightly higher income without taxes and thus need a
lower subsidy to induce them to enroll their children. Needless to say, welfare is higher when
the subsidies are met from foreign aid instead of domestic taxes. Each agent would have to
be given 30% more consumption every period in the trap to equate aggregate welfare to the
one that obtains in the foreign aid regime. When transition is factored in, this ﬁgure reduces
to about 14%; this is about 42% higher than the equivalent ﬁgure in the tax and subsidy
scheme.
As a fraction of GDP, subsidy expenditures are a bit higher than 6.8%. It appears
inconceivable that countries will be willing to donate this amount in foreign aid in perpetuity
for providing basic education; as a fraction of the pre-subsidy GDP, a ﬁgure that can be
compared to the aid-to-GDP ratios given above, the aid has to be as high as 10.4% for
education alone. Given that a welfare improving domestic taxation scheme is possible, it
seems more prudent for an sSA economy to institute such a policy than wait for uncertain
foreign aid. There is nothing in our analysis, however, to indicate foreign aid could hurt
economic prospects.
If the government can borrow on a long-term basis from other countries or development
agencies to ﬁnance increased education expenditures during the transition, thereby not forced
to balance its budget in the short run, the resulting increase in welfare will be in between
the ﬁgures given in Table 3 and the ones reported in this subsection where donor countries
40This data is from Burnside and Dollar (2000) and is averaged over available data for the period 1970-1993.
41There might be a more perceptible increase if labor distortion of taxes is modeled.
28give outright aid instead of loans.
5.3 Abolition of Child Labor
Since indirect costs are a signiﬁcant proportion of the total cost of primary education, it
appears reasonable to consider a policy that abolishes child labor; this would reduce the
cost perceived by parents.42 That is, in addition to ethical reasons, there may be economic
reasons for such an abolition. However, there is a loss of family income, and it will be
i n t e r e s t i n gt oe x a m i n et h eo v e r a l le ﬀect on welfare.
We consider diﬀerent variants of this experiment. We initially assume that abolition of
child labor amounts to zero contribution from the child to the family income. This might
seem extreme since the child could do work within the house or in the family farm if not
outside. So, we also consider a case where the child contributes ϕw irrespective of whether
the child goes to school or not (in earlier experiments the child who does not go to school
earns the full w). In other words, the indirect cost is zero under both assumptions, but
the family income is higher in the second case. Under either assumption, we consider the
abolition of child labor in isolation with the subsidy level kept at the trap level, as well as
with subsidies that would result in the same outlays by the government as in the benchmark
tax-and-subsidy scheme in column 3, Table 3; i.e. we make a revenue neutral comparison.
Table 4 summarizes the outcomes of these experiments, where column 1 repeats the trap
outcome for sake of convenience.
Table 4
Abolition of child labor
Variable 1. Trap 2. Abolish (0) 3. Abolish+sub. (0) 4. Abolish (ϕw) 5. Abolish+sub. (ϕw)
Fraction of educated workers 0% 43.4% 46.0% 43.5% 46.0%
Subsidy level 0.0109 0.0109 0.0741 0.0109 0.0741
Tax rate 0% 0.6% 6.9% 0.6% 6.9%
Output 0.69 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07
Skill premium 4.96 1.14 1.09 1.14 1.09
Enrollment rate 0% 60.4% 100% 60.4% 100%
Dropout rate 0% 28.1% 54.1% 28.1% 54.1%
SS welfare (cons. equiv.) — 1.2% 0.67% 15.1% 14.5%
Trans. welfare (cons. equiv.) — -18.0% -19.1% -3.1% -4.1%
If the child’s contribution to the family is zero after the abolition of child labor goes into
eﬀect (column 2), the fraction of educated workers and the output increases more than they
42We do not model parental choice of child labor supply; any child who is not enrolled is assumed to
contribute w to the household. Therefore, we only accommodate child labor in a macro model, rather than
provide micro foundations for it. Baland and Robinson (2000) and Ranjan (2001) explore the connection
between ﬁnancial market imperfections and child labor. Udry (2003) provides an excellent exposition of the
connection between child labor, human capital investment, and the possibility of a trap.
29do with the tax and subsidy scheme presented in Table 3; n∗
e is now 43.4% instead of 30%
and Y ∗ is 1.07 instead of 1.03. The cost of education goes down from 0.234 to ed =0 .0326,
an 86% decrease. Therefore even though family income goes down right after the abolition,
enrollment increases, causing n∗
e to increase — the utility cost of rich parents, ge, drops by
37%, and that of poor parents, gu, drops by 46%. The increase in attainment causes the
premium to decrease even more than it did earlier.
If the economy could jump to the new steady state right away, the increases in average
wage and the fraction of workers in the educated category with higher utility compensate
for the loss of children’s income and increase welfare. The equivalent compensation is 1.2%
of the trap consumption, lower than that in the tax and subsidy scheme. However, once the
transition, with increased educational investment (in the aggregate) coupled with a loss in
family income, is taken into account there is a huge negative eﬀect on welfare; each worker
is willing to pay 18% of their consumption to stay at the trap.
In column 3, we study how the outcome changes relative to column 2, when in addition to
the abolition of child labor, the government gives subsidies to equate government expenditure
to the one in the benchmark tax-and-subsidy scheme. The entire direct cost is subsidized;
there are enough tax revenues left over to partly compensate each family for lost children’s
contributions. With no indirect costs, a complete subsidy of direct costs implies utility
cost gi =0 , which in turn implies a∗
i =0and thus a 100% enrollment for both types.
But given the tax rate of 6.9% compared to the 0.6% in column 2, the welfare is even
lower.43 The equivalent compensation for a jump to the new steady state is only 0.67% of
consumption; when the transition is included, each household is willing to pay nearly 20%
of its consumption at the trap to avoid this policy.
Columns 4 and 5 consider the less severe assumption of a child’s contribution to family
income of ϕw. The aggregate outcomes of column 4 are same as those of 2, and column 5
same as those of 3, except for welfare. Given the assumption that all children contribute
ϕw to their families, the perceived indirect cost is still zero; the enrollment behavior and
attainment are therefore unchanged. However, the steady state welfare is much higher and
the loss when the transition is factored in is lower. Transitional welfare is never higher
relative to the trap.
Note the high dropout rates when enrollment is driven to 100%. Unless the quality of
education as captured by the πi functions improves, an increase in enrollment, which draws
students from the lower end of the ability distribution, will inevitably raise the likelihood of
failure.
In summary, the abolition of child labor with or without added education subsidies
yields higher enrollment rates and educational attainment than the tax-and-subsidy scheme,
43Nearly the same tax rate is not able to produce a 100% enrollment in the tax and subsidy scheme presented
in Table 1. For enrollment decisions it is the perceived costs of education that matter, and by eliminating
indirect costs, child labor abolition is able to achieve higher enrollment rates.
30but yields lower welfare than the trap once transition is factored in. Even when welfare
comparisons are made across steady states, this scheme fares worse than the tax and subsidy
scheme.
5.4 Compulsory Education
Instead of leaving the enrollment decision to the parent, what if the sSA economies institute
and enforce a law that mandates all children should compulsorily attend school and subsidize









The optimality conditions that characterize enrollments are now irrelevant. Table 5 presents
the outcome in this case.
Column 1 shows the outcome with compulsory education alone, while column 2 does the
revenue neutral experiment. The steady state welfare gain in column 1 is substantial, but is
still lower than that in Table 3. Once transition is factored in, there is a welfare loss. Since
all children, even those whose parents would not have found it proﬁtable to send to school
in the absence of the compulsory education law, are forced to go to school and suﬀer a loss
in income of (1 − ϕ)w, aggregate welfare decreases.
Table 5
Compulsory Education
Variable Trap 1. Compulsory 2. Compulsory+sub.
Fraction of educated workers 0% 46.0% 46.0%
Subsidy level 0.0109 0.0326 0.0741
Tax rate 0% 3.0% 6.9%
Output 0.688 1.07 1.07
Skill premium 4.96 1.09 1.09
Enrollment rate 0% 100% 100%
Dropout rate 0% 54.1% 54.1%
SS welfare (cons. equiv.) — 16.0% 14.5%
Trans. welfare (cons. equiv.) — -3.4% -4.1%
Since compulsory education leaves the children’s contribution at ϕw for all families and
direct costs are fully subsidized, the revenue neutral outcome in column 2 is identical to the
revenue neutral case where the abolition of child labor is assumed to give all families an
income of ϕw from children (Table 4, column 5). In both cases the subsidy is high enough
44In the absence of evidence on enforcement costs, we assume free enforcement of laws. For arguing that
the compulsory education scheme does not perform as well as the tax-and-subsidy scheme, this assumption
is conservative.
31to guarantee 100% enrollment in the steady state. The transitional welfare continues to be
lower than that in the trap.
In conjunction with results from the previous experiment, the above outcome seems to
imply that the sSA economies have to be cautious in aiming purely for the maximization of
enrollment or attainment. The loss of children’s contribution to family income can decrease
aggregate welfare. Moreover, unless the quality of education is improved, increases in en-
rollment draw students from the lower end of the ability pool thereby increasing the rate of
failure.45
5.5 Improvements in Infrastructure
Can the sSA economies emerge from the trap due to an increase in the total factor produc-
tivity, A? As mentioned earlier, Mauritius is credited for opening up its economy to foreign
technology to spur development. From the point of view of the trap condition (8), it can be
shown that (e we − e wu) is increasing in A, whenever e we > e wu, making it less likely that a trap
will result. That is, instead of changing the educational costs through subsidies, can the
return to education be increased and the incentive to become educated be provided by an
improvement in the production function? We look at potential improvements in infrastruc-
ture that can increase A a st h e r ei sm o r ed i r e c te v i d e n c eo nt h i s .I fo n ev i e w sA as Iζ, where
I is the stock of infrastructure and ζ is an elasticity parameter, one can ask by what factor
I will have to increase in order to take the economy to the same steady state that results in
the tax-and-subsidy case.
The World Development Report 1994 surveys the estimates for ζ found in literature as
well as addresses the issue of causality.46 We use ζ =0 .4, which is at the upper end of the
range of reported estimates, and close to the one reported by Aschauer (1989). We ﬁnd that
to get close to the benchmark n∗
e =0 .38, the value of A has to increase from 2 to 5. Using
t h ea b o v ev a l u ef o rζ then implies that the infrastructure stock has to increase by a factor
close to 10.47
In the absence of clear evidence connecting infrastructure expenditure and the stock we
do not attempt to estimate the tax rate that will be needed to ﬁnance this increase and the
concomitant eﬀect on welfare. It suﬃces to note that a massive increase in infrastructure is
required to achieve the same eﬀect that can be obtained by altering the composition of the
45In contrast to the way we have modeled it, if ability of the child is unknown even to the parents, and
enrolling a child in school is the only way to learn this ability, compulsory education might have a value that
we are unable to capture. In that case, compulsory education might have a more positive welfare eﬀect than
we have credited to it.
46See Box 1.1.
47The World Development Report 1994 states that the slope of the infrastructure stock vs per capita GDP
is roughly 1. Given that the Mauritian per capita income is about 10 times the median of our sSA sample,
its infrastructure capital is 10 times higher, in line with the required increase in I we estimate.
32workforce (with the same production function) through a relatively painless tax and subsidy
scheme.
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
Is our result that the tax and subsidy scheme is superior to other schemes driven purely by
the parameters assumed? It is the loss of contribution from low-ability children, with little
chance of educational success, that contributes to the poor performance of the compulsory
education scheme and the abolition of child labor. We have already addressed the sensitivity
to assumed contribution from children by examining incomes of 0 and ϕw in Table 4. While
a higher assumed contribution does move this policy toward the tax and subsidy scheme in
welfare terms, any further increase in this assumed contribution would call into question the
very eﬀectiveness of abolition. Likewise, in the abolition and in the compulsory education
scheme, we have conducted revenue neutral experiments relative to the tax and subsidy
scheme and ﬁnd they still do not dominate in terms of welfare.
One other check we perform is altering the human capital production function for the
uneducated, πu, to make it identical to the one for the educated, πe. We present the welfare
ﬁgures, in consumption equivalents relative to the initial condition, for this experiment in
Table 6.
Table 6
Welfare Comparisons with identical π functions
Variable 1. Subsidy 2. Abolish (0) 3. Abolish (ϕw) 4. Compulsory
SS welfare (cons. equiv.) 10.5% -8.1% 4.4% 3.5%
Trans. welfare (cons. equiv.) 4.3% -17.8% -4.7% -5.6%
The relative welfare ranking is unchanged. The subsidy scheme (with s = .09 as in column
2, Table 3) does best with the abolition of child labor with zero assumed contribution from
children the worst; abolition with some contribution from children and compulsory education
lie in between. The absolute welfare ﬁgures for the subsidy are lower than those in Table
3, but still substantial; as mentioned earlier, the relative ranking of the schemes is probably
more important than the absolute numbers. In results omitted for brevity, we ﬁnd that the
improvement in quality reduces the dropout rate and increases attainment.
We have focused primarily on decreasing e, and later increasing A, to trigger development
in these economies. We also verify that altering the parameters suggested by our theoretical
conditions (an increase in β and a decrease in σ) would result in similar development, though
it is unclear how policy could be used to alter these parameters. As noted earlier, our
assumption that a higher wage from education does not materialize until the second period
has implications for the value of the indirect cost. We search for the minimum value of ϕ
that will get the economy out of the trap; it is 0.44 as opposed to the baseline value of 0.415.
A higher value for ϕ decreases the opportunity cost of education and makes the trap less
33likely. For our purposes, whether an economy is exactly at a trap matters less than how well
the various policies for development perform. And for a wide range of parameter values the
tax and subsidy scheme yields the best welfare.48
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have presented details on the condition of education and the economy of the
low performing sub-Saharan African countries. These economies can be characterized by a
simple heterogeneous-agent model in which the high cost of education relative to income and
the skill premium results in a low steady state with minimal educational attainment. Policy
experiments on a calibrated model suggest that a tax and subsidy scheme that redistributes
resources at the trap from poor households withl o w e ra b i l i t yc h i l d r e nt ot h o s ew i t hh i g h e r
ability children can pry the economy out of the trap, thus freeing it from dependence on
foreign aid in order to achieve similar outcomes. This policy is superior, in welfare terms,
to the abolition of child labor and the institution and enforcement of compulsory education
laws, whether the transition is taken into account or not. Under revenue neutrality, these
latter policies are unable to reverse the loss of contributions low ability children would have
made to their families had they not been forced to attend school. These simulations question
the stated goal of several agencies of achieving universal enrollment. Given the current stage
of development of these economies and the quality of their educational systems that are
likely to prevail in the near future, polices that guarantee this level of enrollment need not
be welfare improving. How increases in enrollment and attainment are achieved seems to
matter crucially.
W h i l ew eh a v ei d e n t i ﬁed the policy that appears to perform best, we have been silent
on political economy considerations and diﬃculties in implementing reforms; these deserve
more serious attention. Further work is also warranted in assembling better data in order to
reﬁne the calibration process. This is especially needed in order to study improvements in
the quality of education, which is subsumed in our probability functions. An improvement
in the quality of education (the π function) will alter welfare comparisons by boosting the
schemes that result in 100% enrollment. In other words, our policy conclusions should not be
viewed as an argument for keeping school enrollment permanently low in sub-Saharan Africa;
such an argument would never be made for developed economies. Rather, they highlight the
pressing need to improve the quality of education in order to successfully implement ideas
such as universal enrollment. One could model the education sector explicitly and study
the quality of teachers as well as indices such as teacher-student ratios to address quality
improvements. These are the topics of ongoing research.
48For instance, irrespective of the value of ϕ, abolition of child labor implies an indirect cost of zero, and
the relative welfare ordering obtained for the baseline value of ϕ =0 .415 continue to obtain.
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